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Frank H. Clarke
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Masako N. Darrough
and John M. Heineke
University of Santa Clara

Optimal Pricing Policy in the
Presence of Experience Effects*
I. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the problem of optimal
intertemporal pricing for a monopolist when current (and past) output affect future cost and/or
demand conditions through "experience" in
production and/or in consumption. Learning by
doing, the experience curve, contagion, habit
formation, bandwagon, and snob effects are all
examples of terminologies used to describe such
situations. We call these "experience effects"
for convenience and explore profit-maximizing
pricing behavior when such effects exist. 1
In the traditional profit-maximization model, a
firm chooses the price-output combination so as
to maximize short-run (i.e., current) profits. The
familiar MC = MR equality (given that price is
higher than average variable cost and a nonbinding capacity constraint) is a necessary condition for
price takers as well as price makers. This assumes that the current pricing decision has no
bearing on the future, so that long-run profit is
maximized by a series of short-run maximizing
*We would like to thank our colleagues Frank Milne,
Thomas Russell, and Hersh Shefrin for their helpful comments. The first author gratefully acknowledges the support
of the Killam Foundation (Canada Council Killam Research
Fellow) and of the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (grant A9082).
1. Here we used the word "experience" to encapsulate all
situations where the present depends on the integral or sum of
past values of decision variables.
(Journal of Business, 1982, vol. 55, no. 4)
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/82/5504-0005$01.50
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We use a general model
to analyze the optimal
intertemporal pricing
policy for a monopolist
when current and past
output play a role in
determining future cost
and/or demand conditions through "experience" in production
and/or in consumption.
As would be expected,
the optimal price path
depends on the manner
in which experience affects demand and cost
functions. Three special
cases are scrutinized:
( 1) learning by doing in
which production costs
are scaled downward
over time; (2) learning
by doing in which production costs are translated downward over
time; and (3) the case of
demand satiation. For
these cases, the optimal
price paths are shown to
be, respectively, decreasing, increasing,
and nonmonotonic.
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decisions. When this independence condition does not hold, however,
it is not possible to maximize long-run profits by using such myopic
decision rules. For example, a firm may set a price lower than that
dictated by the short-run optimum in order to increase current sales, if
this larger sale leads to lower costs in the future. The phenomenon of
cost falling with cumulative production is often referred to as "learning
by doing" or the "experience curve" phenomenon. In this case, a
J1rice lower than the myopic price may seem to be intuitive. However,
a series of questions immediately comes to mind for which neither
intuition nor the traditional marginal conditions provide easy solution.
Among these questions are the following: Should price be continuously
lowered throughout the planning horizon? If so, at what rate? In other
words, what is the optimal price path? Are there situations when price
goes up, goes down, or fluctuates? Does it vary continuously or exhibit
jumps? Obviously the answers to these questions depend on specifics:
In particular, exactly how do current output and sales affect future
costs and/or demand?
These questions have been touched upon in the literature, mostly in
the context of experience curves and the market penetration (or contagion) model. The former deals with the widely observed phenomenon
of falling cost due to experience (learning) in production. Such cost
reductions are not a result of economies of scale, but rather of endogenously induced technological change. 2 In this case, production
costs will be a function not only of current output but also of past
production (cumulative output). The latter phenomenon deals with
situations such as diffusion of innovations in which market demand for
a durable good increases at first and decreases eventually as the product becomes more widely accepted and the market becomes saturated.
Demand, therefore, depends not only on price but also on past purchases (cumulative sales).
Bass (1969, 1980) focused on the question of diffusion and adoption
rates of consumer durables. Assumed in his model (1980) are: (1) a
marginal cost function which decreases with total cumulative output,
and (2) a constant price elasticity of demand with changing market size.
In addition, Bass postulates that (3) firms set prices according to
short-run profit-maximization principles. This latter assumption combined with (1), results in a monotonically decreasing price over time.
The model discussed by Bass is fundamentally different from the
present model which focuses on the intertemporal or long-run optimizing behavior of a monopolist in the presence of experience effects.
Robinson and Lakhani (1975) have adopted a model similar to that of
Bass to analyze the question of dynamic pricing strategy. Again de2. The primary distinction between technological change induced by learning and the
more familiar technological change of, say, growth theory, is the endogenous and
exogenous origins, respectively, of changes.
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mand and cost vary with past sales. In a discretized example involving
specific parameterizations of demand and cost functions, the optimal
price path is calculated numerically and is shown to be quite different
from that given by short-run profit maximization.
Dolan and Jeuland (1981) and Jeuland and Dolan (1982) have
analyzed optimal pricing strategies when experience effects exist on
both cost and demand sides of the market. In these papers, however,
the authors assume that unit production costs are independent of the
production rate and follow Bass in adopting specific parametric representation of demand, thus limiting the scope of their conclusions.
Spence (1981) explores some of the implications for competition in
an industry where firm costs decline over time due to "learning." He
focuses on the case of no discounting and, like each of the authors
referenced, adopts a specialized functional form for firm cost functions. We show below that such cost specifications constrain the optimal price trajectory to be monotonically falling over time. This will not
be the case in general.
It is the purpose of this paper to build and analyze a general model
which encompasses various experience situations including the models
discussed above. The next section presents this model. The third
section deals in more detail with two cases of learning by doing in
which learning influences cost in two distinct manners: In one case, the
optimal price falls and, in the other, increases throughout the entire
planning period. The satiation process in demand is analyzed in a
similar manner in Section IV. The fifth section contains an example in
which the optimal price path exhibits jump discontinuities, even though
all the data are continuous. A brief summary and conclusions are
followed by the Appendix which addresses the question of the existence of optimal price paths.
II.

The General Model

We denote by x the (cumulative) quantity sold of commodity X in the
past and p the price of X (which can be interpreted as the reservation
price). Then,

x

= q(x,p),

(1)

where .X= dxldt, current output, andq(x,p) is the demand function. In
addition, we have
c(x,q),

(2)

a given production cost function. Both q and c are assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable, with the partial derivative qp < 0
everywhere, and q > 0 for all nonnegative prices.
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The problem the firm faces is to choose the optimal time path for p in
such a way as to maximize the present value of the stream of profit.
That is
max
p(t)

fr e-61 {pq(x,p)
J0

- c[x,q(x,p)]}dt,

(3)

wherep(·) is piecewise continuous and assumes values in (O,oo), andx
satisfies (1) and x(O) = x 0 , the cumulative output at t = 0. We shall
assume that an optimal solution (x ,p) exists (the existence question is
addressed in the Appendix).
We proceed by applying the maximum principle to this optimal
control problem (see, e.g., Intriligator 1971). The Hamiltonian
H(t,x,A,p), where A is the adjoint variable, is given by Aq(x,p) +
e-6t{pq(x,p) - c[x,q(x,p)]}. The adjoint equation in this case is

(4)
The fact that H(t,X,A,") achieves a maximum over(O,oo) atp givesHp
0; in this case
Aqp

+ e-at (q + pqP

- c qqp)

=

0.

=

(5)

We solve (5) for A to obtain
A

= e-at (cq

(6)

- p - q/qp).

Substitution of (6) into (4) gives

A. =e-at (ex + qqxlqp).

(7)

The maximum principle also yields the transversality condition
A(T)

=

0.

For later reference we note the relation HPP
trajectory (x ,p). Therefore

(8)
~

0 along the optimal
(9)

It is common practice to interpret A as a shadow price, and then use
equations such as (4) and (5) as the basis for policy prescriptions.
However, it is possible to eliminate A from these equations and to
define a function 1> which appreciably enhances the interpretability of
solutions. We set
1>(x,p) = Cq[x,q(x,p)] - p - q(x,p)/qp(x,p).

(10)

In view of (6), along the optimal path [x(t),p(t)], we have 1>[x(t),p(t)]
= e6tA, the "spot shadow price," a function oft which is continuous.
By using (6) and (7), we then calculate
d

dt 1>[x(t),p(t)]

=

.

1>

= 81> + qqx/qp + Cx.

(11)
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Let us note that, in light of (8), one has 1> (T)

= 0. Further (9) implies

f/>vqv ~ 0 at [x(t),p(t)]

(12)

Solving the ordinary differential equation (11) for 1> (t), we obtain
f/>(f) = -

rT

(Cx

+ qqxfqp)e-15(r-tldr.

When this is expressed in terms of the original variables, we obtain the
following theorem.
THEOREM: The following relationship holds along the optimal price
path:

Notice that p(t) + qlqv is the usual "short-run" marginal revenue
(MR), the immediate benefit, from selling one more unit, and Cq is the
usual "short-run" marginal cost (MC) of producing one more unit. The
integral term is the present value of the "long-run effects" of the
current and past actions. It is obvious from (13) that when ex "I 0 and/or
qx I- 0 (i.e., when experience effects are present), the usual short-run
marginal cost pricing rule no longer yields an optimal policy. There
must be a "wedge" between MR and MC (the value of the integral in
[13]). As an example, consider the case in which ex < 0 (i.e., learning
by doing) and qx = 0. Since the integral is necessarily negative in this
case, we have MC > MR along the optimal path for all time except at T.
The wedge between MC and MR represents the present value offuture
cost reductions due to an increase in cumulative output (experience).
In this sense, (13) can be considered as the dynamic analogue of the
short-run (static) marginal condition. Of course one may interpret (13)
as a condition which equates "full long-run MC" to "full long-run
MR''; the theorem simply tells one how these full marginal values are
to be calculated.
If p is differentiable, we derive from (10) the following relation:
(14)
But</>

= 84>

+ qqxlqv

+ex from (11). Substituting this into (14), we get

(15)
Recall thatf/> is the wedge betweenMC andMR, orf/>(t) = MC(t)MR(t). Furthermore, we have from (10): 1>x = aMC/ax - aMR/ax.
Since q = i, we can now rewrite (14) as
· ,~,.
P'fJP

=;, _ ( aMC _ iJMR).
'fJ
ax
ax X'
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or equivalently
f/:1 dp = df/:1 _ ( oMC _ oMR )dx.

ox

p

ox

(16)

As long as cpp 1- 0, we have dp determined by the difference between
df/:1 and[· ]dx. The df/:1 represents how the wedge is changing, and[· ]dx
represents how MC and MR are affected by the cumulative output. In
other words, the direction of change in the optimal price depends on
the two (possibly opposing) effects: (1) how fast the spot shadow price
of x changes, and (2) how MC and MR are affected by x. One might
interpret these effects as long-run (potential) and short-run (realized)
effects. Equation (16) proves to be extremely useful in interpreting our
results. In particular, diagrammatic analyses will be presented in the
next two sections to sort out the two effects and to analyze how the
optimal price changes.
As we show in Section V, p(t) may not be continuous, let alone
differentiable everywhere. There is, however, a simple additional hypothesis that will guarantee continuity of p(t).
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that q and c satisfy globally the inequality
Cqqq;, - 2qp

+ qqpp/qp > 0.

(17)

Then the optimal price path p(t) is continuous and differentiable on
[O,T].

If(17) holds, thenHPP < 0 everywhere. Thus, the equation
= 0 uniquely defines p = p(t), and differentiability of
p (t) follows as a consequence of the implicit function theorem.
REMARK: The inequality in the statement of the proposition is
satisfied, for example, if q(x,p) = f(x)g(p ), in which/> 0, g ;?! 0, g' <
0, g is concave and, in addition, c is convex in q. Examples include
exponential functions for g(p ).
PROOF:

Hp[t ,x(t),A(t),p]

III.

Learning by Doing

We shall now study two special cases of the general model in which
we impose additional structure, and in so doing arrive at certain global
information regarding the behavior of the optimal price path. Both
cases are instances of learning by doing, that is, experience has the
beneficial effect oflowering the cost function (ex < 0). Yet, as we shall
see, the specific way in which costs are lowered is important in determining the price profile: in one case the optimal price is an increasing
function of time and, in the other, a decreasing function of time.
The Case of Scaling in c.

We assume that in this subsection c(x,q) has the form
c0

+ m(x)h(q),

(18)
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where m(x) > 0, m'(x) < 0, h(O) = 0, h(q) > 0, h'(q) > 0, and h is
convex. Thus, the production cost curve is scaled downward as x
increases.3 We assume that demand is unaffected by experience: qx =
0. Note that for a range of parameter values, a differentiable optimal
price pathp(t) is known to exist (see Appendix). For present purposes,
however, we merely assume that such exists.
PROPOSITION 2: In this case, the optimal price path is a decreasing
function of time.
PROOF: The equation (11) becomes in this case
<i>

= 8cf> + m'(x)h(q) < 8cf>.

Now if cf> were ever negative or 0, then the solution to this differential
equation would necessarily be negative beyond that point. But cf> (T) =
0 from (8), so we conclude that cf> (t) > 0 for all t < T. Equation (15)
becomes in this case
(19)
since, for this problem, cf>x = Cqx· We now claim that ex - qcqx is
nonnegative; it then follows from (19) that p is negative, since the
right-hand side is positive and cf>v ~ 0 (from [12]). To prove this claim,
observe that ex - qcqx reduces to
m'(x)[h(q) - qh'(q)],

so it suffices to show h(q)- qh'(q)
we know
h(q)

= h(q)

~

0. But from the convexity of h,

- h(O)

~

qh'(q).

Q.E.D.
We now turn our attention to a diagrammatic exposition of this
special case. Since qx = 0, equation (16) becomes cf>vdP = dcf>
iJMC!ox dx, which is strictly positive fort < T. This implies that

I a~c I dx + dcf> > o.
The case when dcf> is negative is shown in figure 1. Comparing two
points of time t and t + a, we see the MC curve shifting from MCt to
MCtH. The wedge between MC and MR required for dynamic profit
maximization changes from cf>t to cf>t+a (with cf>t+a < cf>t)· But if this
reduction in the wedge is smaller than the reduction in MC (i.e., aMC
in the diagram), then the optimal output will increase from qt to qt+A,
hence price falls. If dcf> is positive, then it is clear that the two effects
reinforce each other, resulting in a price reduction.
In this case, even though the long-run potential benefit from added
3. A case treated by Bass and others which falls in this category is that in which
marginal cost is constant (i.e., h linear in q) and m (x) = [Y.
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FIG.

1

experience may be decreasing as the end of the planning period is
approached, this is outweighed by the (realized) reduction in marginal
cost. Thus, the firm decides to lower price continuously.

The Case of Translation in c
We assume now that c(x,q) has the form
c0 + s(x) + r(q),

(20)

where r' > 0, s' < 0, and s is convex on (O,oo). Thus, in this case,
experience translates (shifts) the cost curve downward. We continue to
assume qx = 0. Again, the proposition in the Appendix implies the
existence of a smooth optimal price path for at least a subclass of such
problems.
PROPOSITION 3: In this case, the optimal price path is an increasing
function of time.
PROOF: If we substitute our particular c into cp, we see that <Px = 0
in this case, and (15) now becomes
pcpp =

Cx

+ 8cp

=

s'[x(t)] - 8 J:s'[x(T)]e-B<r-n dT.

Our task reduces to proving that the right-hand side of this equation is
negative (for cpp ~ 0 from [12]), which we proceed to do.
Since s is convex, s' is nondecreasing, so:
s '[x(t)] - 8

J:

s '[x(T)]e-B<r-n dT

~ s'[X(t)]

- 8s'[x(t)]rT e-B(r-f)dT

=s'[x(t)]{ 1 - 8rT
=

Q.E.D.

s'[x(t)]e-a<r-t>

e-B(r-tli)T}

< 0.

Optimal Pricing Policy
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It is a simple matter to show (see fig. 2) why the optimal price
increases. Since the cost function is additively separable, we have
oMC/ox = 0. Thus, (16) becomes <f>pdp = d<f>. Butci> = 8<f> + Cx = 8<f> +
s' = p<f>p, which has been shown to be strictly negative above. Thus,
d<f> or ci> < 0. As the wedge between MC and MR becomes smaller
(since future benefits from a cost reduction become smaller), the optimal quantity falls, hence the optimal price increases.
This is a case in which experience reduces total cost, without affecting
marginal cost. On the other hand, "fixed cost" is reduced; for example, organization of the production process may benefit from experience. However, actual production of each unit may not; since MC in
terms of, say, additional materials and labor time required might be
exactly the same. In such a case, larger sales (by pricing lower) are
warranted in view of future cost reductions. But the gains from such
policies decrease continuously over time: hence, a continuous price
mcrease.
In summary, the two cases studied in this section both deal with
learning by doing, where production cost is reduced by experience, yet
they are dramatically dissimilar with respect to optimal pricing policy.
It has been shown that this is due to the nature of the cost reduction:
The marginal cost function is lowered in the first case, but not in the
second.

IV. Demand Experience
When we examine demand cases analogous to those of Section III,
we find that, in contrast to the case of learning, the behavior of the
price path is not generally monotonic. We shall illustrate this in the
case in which q (x ,p) is of the form
q (x ,p)

= a- (x )p (p),

(21)
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and c (x ,q) = c0 q. This formulation was used by Robinson and Lakhani
in an attempt to model the case of consumer durables .4
We assume that O" (x) and p (p) are positive, with p < 0, that for x in
(O,x0 ), 0" (X) = 0, and that for x in [x 0 ,oo), 0" (X) < 0. Thus, x 0 can be
viewed as a threshhold beyond which consumer satiation begins.
PROPOSITION 4: In this case, for sufficiently large horizons (T), the
optimal price path exhibits at least one period of increase and at least
one period of decrease.
PROOF: In this case (11) becomes cb = 6</> + 0" 1 p2/p 1 ~ 61> and it
follows as in Proposition 2 that</> ~ 0. We suppose Tis large enough so
that the threshold x0 is breached; thus, cb > 6</> fort beyond a certain
point. It then follows that 1> is strictly negative for t < T.
We tum to (15), which now transmutes to p<f>p = 6</> + p 20" /p
Initially (when x < x0 ) the right-hand side is negative, sop > 0. Fort
near T, <f>(t) is almost zero, since <f>(T) = 0, so the right-hand side must
be positive; that is, p < 0. Q.E.D.
To supplement the mathematical derivation of the property of p, we
shalf now give a heuristic exposition of this case using MR and MC
curves. Equation (16) becomes <f>pdp = d<f> + fJMR!ax dx.
For x in (O,x 0), we have 0" 1(X) = 0, thus cb = 6</> < 0 (since 1> < 0) and
aMR!ax = 0. Thus, in this case, the (negative) wedge betweenMC and
MR is growing larger in magnitude, resulting in price increases. This
can be interpreted as growing spot shadow prices as the satiation point
is approached; that is, the negative benefit is felt more strongly as we
get close (see fig. 3).
However, once the satiation point (x > x 0 ) is reached, two effects
again begin to interact. When (16) is positive, we have d<f> + aMR!Ox
dx > 0.
Assume that consumer satiation decreases both demand and MR
(see fig. 4). Since 1> (T) = 0 and 1> < 0, cb > 0 sufficiently near T (d</> >
0). Thus, we have
1

1

1

1

1

•

aMR dx I < d</> or il.<f> > il.MR.
I----ax

The wedge is shrinking fast enough to compensate for the reduction in
MR. In this case we see an increasing q and, hence, a decreasing p.
V.

Example

The purpose of this section is to give a specific example in which the
unique optimal price path is a discontinuous function of time. Besides
4. In their formulation, demand for the durable at any point of time is a function of x
andp, but is independent of pricing history. We feel this is not an entirely realistic model
for durables. Since consumers "typically" buy only one unit, current demand should
depend on which segments of population (differentiated by their reservation prices) have
bought in the past.
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FIG. 3

showing that our attention to this issue in Section II was not unwarranted, the example demonstrates, perhaps counterintuitively, that
sudden large price fluctuations are not necessarily a sign of
mismanagement-they may, in fact, be unavoidable in the optimal
price path.
We take for q(x,p) the function e-P 1100 , and we choose [0,1] as the
planning period, with x 0 = 0. It follows that x and q lie in [0, 1] at all
times. Let a < {3 < y < 1/3 be three positive numbers, and letf(q) be
any continuously differentiable function which satisfies the following
conditions:
i) f(q);;?; 0 for q e [0,1];/(q) = 0 if and only if q = {3 or y.
ii) lf'(q)
1 for q e [0,1/3].
iii) f'(q);;?; 1 for q e [1/3,3/4].
iv) f'(q) > 104 for q e [3/4, 1].

I ::;;

We use the cost function defined by c(x,q) = -100q lnq + f(q) +
g(x,q), where g(x,q) =[max {(x- a)(q- {3) 2 , (a- x)(q - y) 2 }]2 • The
function g is continuously differentiable, as is q lnq for q > 0. Further,
conditions i-iv above were specified to imply Cq > 0. (It is a simple
matter to verify this on each of the intervals [0,1/3], [1/3,3/4] and [3/4,1]

MC

MR

FIG.

4
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I I :; :;

if one observes the inequality gq
4.) Thus, cis not unreasonable in
the role of a cost function.
For this case, the optimal pricing problem reduces to minimizing

-J

1

0

=-

e-M [pq - c(x,q)]dt

Le-~> 1 [-lOOq
1

=

J

1

0

e-M [f(x)

=

J

1

0

lnq- c(x,q)]dt

+ g(x,x)]dt

e-Mh(x,x)dt,

where we have defined h = f + g. Note that h is nonnegative by
construction, and can only equal zero when bothf and g are zero. This
can only happen in two ways: if q = y andx:;;:;; a, or if q = f3 andx ~a.
It follows that there is a unique policy which makes h = 0 everywhere
(and consequently is optimal): Useq = x = y untilx =a, then switch to
q = x = f3. In terms of price, this means that price is piecewise constant
with an upward jump at time t = a/y.
VI.

Summary and Conclusions

We have analyzed the optimal intertemporal pncmg policy for a
monopolist in the presence of experience effects. The solution to this
"optimal control problem" is completely determined mathematically
by the differential equations and boundary conditions of Section II.
The dynamic analogue of the short-run marginal condition (Theorem,
Sec. II) was shown to be
MR = MC

+

rT

(ex

+ qqxlqp)e-ll(T-t)dT,

(22)

where we have referred to the integral term as the wedge between MC
and MR required for long-run optimality.
It is clear from our analysis that short-run profit-maximizing decision
rules will not, in general, lead to maximum long-run profit when experience effects are present. Although the phenomenon of temporally
falling prices is often observed in markets where experience effects are
alleged to exist, it was shown that this is not the only scenario possible.
The optimal price path depends on precisely how experience effects
influence demand and cost functions. Three special cases were
scrutinized in which the mathematical solution was supplemented by
diagrammatic analysis.
In the first case of learning by doing, we found that the optimal price

Optimal Pricing Policy
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falls throughout the period. This result is due to the nature of the cost
reduction: Cost is scaled downward and hence the MC curve falls
over time. Intuitively we may say that the change in the long-run effect
is outweighed by the change in the short-run effect. If MC falls fast
enough, the firm should lower price continuously.
When cost is translated downward due to experience, on the other
hand, the optimal price increases throughout the period. Translation
implies an MC function which is independent of x. Thus, the short-run
effect is absent, and the change in the long-run effect determines the
price path. Since the long-run benefit from experience declines over
time, the incentive to sell large quantities also diminishes: hence, an
increasing price path.
A similar analysis was made of the case of experience effects on the
demand side. If cumulative scales have negative impact on future
demand (i.e., eventual satiation), then the price path will exhibit both
periods of increase and decrease.
Appendix

Existence of Optimal Price Paths
Direct application of general existence theorems from optimal control or the
calculus of variations is difficult in the case of the problem treated in this
article, for these would mandate the presence of constraints such as p 0 ~ p ~
P1. which we do not impose. To show, however, that existence is not a
hopeless feature of the problem, we prove by ad hoc means the following result
for a subclass of problems.
Let q (x ,p) have the form f(p) = ae- 13 P for a < 1.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that for some m > 0, the cost function c satisfies:
(a) Cqq;.;;. - l!(a{3); (b) Cx;.;;. - m; (c) Cq;.;;. me 6 Tffj - 11{3. Then there is an
optimal price pathp(t) for the problem of Section II, with 0 <p(t) < oo, andp is
continuous and differentiable.
PROOF: The problem may be recast as that of minimizing

=

J.r

e- 61 [c(x,x) +.X 1n(xla)/{3]dt,

(23)

wherei = q lies in (O,oo). Now, the function v-i> c(x,v) + v ln(v/a)/{3 is convex
as a consequence of (a) (its second derivative is positive on [O,a]), so that, from
standard results, it can be shown that there is a solutionx(t) to minimizing (23)
subject to 0 ~ i ~a. It remains to show that .X is never equal to 0 or a. We will
show this by invoking the necessary conditions of Clarke (1976) for this
"generalized problem of Bolza." These assert the existence of a function A
satisfying:
'A.

= e-61cx for all t,

A.(T)

= 0,

(24)
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and the inequalities

A(t)

~ e-81 {cq + fv

A(t)

[v

ln(v/a)/.BJv~.x} if 0 ~.X <

~ e-81 {cq + :fv [v ln(v/a)/.B]v~.x} if i

=

a

a.

Now suppose in fact thati had the temerity to equal a somewhere. Then by
the preceding A(T) ~ e-I>T{cq(x,a) + 1/,B} for someT, so by (b) we deduceA(T)
~ m/a. On the other hand, (24) together with (c) yields A.(t) ~ m(l - e-fl'r)!a for
all t, which is a contradiction. Thus, i is never a.
That :X can never be 0 follows from the first general inequality for A, together
with the observation d/dv [v ln(vla)!.B]v~o = - oo.
As for the smoothness of p, it follows from applying proposition 1, Section
II. Q.E.D.
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